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Book Review 
I Love You, Big Brother 
JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: 
How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS. 
By Malcolm M. Feeleyt and Edward L. Rubintt. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. iii, 490. $69.95 cloth. 
Reviewed by Neal Devinsttt 
INTRODUCTION 
The image of the judge as social crusader increasingly seems a relic of 
times past. Over the past several years, left-leaning political scientists, law 
professors, and interest groups have made clear that courts should steer 
clear of policy making. For some, courts lack the capacity to change the 
world through their edicts and, as such, policy making is a "hollow hope."1 
For others, elected officials are more apt to embrace progressive causes 
than are judges? 
Judicial policy making has, moreover, always been a whipping boy 
for traditionalists. Most notably, judicial policy making must overcome the 
so-called countermajoritarian difficulty-that is, the presumption that the 
democratic character of legislation, in and of itself, warrants judicial 
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1. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1992). Under this account, courts should either steer away from social reform altogether or, 
alternatively, issue "minimalist" decisions that encourage popularly elected officials and the people to 
sort out the Constitution's meaning. The most visible explication of this argument is CAss R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL M!NIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
2. The American Civil Liberties Union and National Abortion Rights Action League, for 
example, have both dubbed Congress their "court of last resort" W. John Moore, In Whose Court?, 
NAT'L J., Oct. 5, 1991, at 2400 (quoting Leslie A. Harris, American Civil Liberties Union Chief 
Legislative Counsel in Washington); see also National Abortion Rights Action League "Supreme Court 
Alert" (June 27, 1991), quoted in LOUIS FISHER AND NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (2d ed. 1996); Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 
241, 251-66 (1993). Of course, the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress may have tempered this 
enthusiasm. Nonetheless, left-leaning academics still embrace constitutional interpretation outside the 
courts. See MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
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restraint.3 Correspondingly, traditionalists argue that it is simply wrong for 
judges to see themselves as social reformers, overturning governmental 
action because it is inconsistent with their vision of good public policy. 
These arguments are more than academic platitudes. Ever since Richard 
Nixon's efforts to undo the Warren Court, the Republican party has em-
braced them. 4 
That the Republican party's complaints and the more recent attacks 
launched by the left both sound a similar theme, of course, does not mean 
that anything approaching a consensus has been reached on, say, the suc-
cesses and failures of the Warren Court. Nevertheless, this confluence of 
traditionalists and progressives bodes ill for judicial policy making. In par-
ticular, while there once was a raging debate among academics, interest 
groups, and elected officials about the propriety of court ordered institu-
tional reform, 5 the question today is whether someone will defend judicial 
policy making at all. 6 
Enter Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin. In Judicial Policy Making 
and the Modern State, Feeley and Rubin serve up a nuanced and emphatic 
defense of judicial policy making. More than any other work on this sub-
ject, they offer a provocative and comprehensive explanation of why judi-
cial policy making is legitimate. In part, by calling attention to how agency 
policy making represents a fundamental break from federalism and separa-
tion of powers protections, Feeley and Rubin forthrightly argue that these 
structural constraints cannot stand in the way of policy making by 
3. The classic work on this subject is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). Over the years, nearly all scholars 
have embraced Bickel's legislature-centered vision, including theorists who defend an expansive 
interpretive role for the courts. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative 
State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 759,761-62 (1997). 
4. Party platforms routinely condemn judicial policy making, arguing that "[i]t is not a judicial 
function to reorder the economic, political, and social priorities of our nation. The intrusion of the 
courts into such areas undermines the stature of the judiciary and erodes respect for the rule of law." 
Text of the 1984 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 1984 CONO. Q. ALMANAC 41-B, 55-B. 
Ronald Reagan's first attorney general, William French Smith, likewise rebuked the judiciary, charging 
that "[n]ot only are unelected jurists with life tenure less attuned to the popular will than regularly 
elected officials, but judicial policy making also is inevitably inadequate or imperfect policy making." 
William French Smith, Urging Judicial Restraint, 68 A.B.A. J. 59, 60 (1982). 
5. For a sampling of arguments attacking institutional reform litigation as inconsistent with the 
judicial role, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Robert F. Nagel, 
Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1978); and 
Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982). The classic defenses of institutional 
reform litigation include Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the 
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980); and William A. Fletcher, The 
Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE LJ. 635 (1982). 
6. Of course, some academics still wax nostalgic about the achievements of the Warren Court-
hoping against hope that the judiciary will once again embrace that brand of compassionate 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. 
REv. 43 (1989). 
HeinOnline -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 1285 1999
1999] I LOVE YOU, BIG BROTHER 1285 
unelected officials, including judges. According to this account, to 
"demand that courts continue to be constrained by these structural princi-
ples, particularly when other branches have abandoned them [wrongly] 
excludes the courts from the modem governmental process" (p. 343). 
Moreover, building upon a handful of case studies on prison reform 
litigation, Feeley and Rubin set out to eviscerate traditionalist arguments 
that judicial policy making allows unelected and unaccountable judges to 
set policy according to their individual senses of right and wrong. Specifi-
cally, although judicial policy making involves the creation of new legal 
doctrine, it is bound by judge-created "coordinating ideas"-precedential 
standards that limit what courts can and cannot do (pp. 241-48). In Feeley 
and Rubin's estimation, prison reform litigation exemplifies how courts 
devise such coordinating ideas and, in so doing, honor the rule of law. 
Feeley and Rubin's account is truly ambitious and undoubtedly will 
be a force to reckon with in the next wave of academic discourse over judi-
cial policy making. Nevertheless, for all its innovations, Judicial Policy 
Making is ultimately unconvincing. First, assuming that agency policy 
making is legitimate, the court-agency analogy is far from perfect. Judicial 
interpretations of the Constitution are not subject to the same types of 
democratic controls as agency interpretations of statutes. With life tenure 
and some degree of political insulation, judges do not relate to other parts 
of the government in the same way that agencies do. Moreover, in making 
the court-agency analogy, Feeley and Rubin read too much into too little-
a single nongeneralizable case study on prison reform litigation. 
Second, the saga of prison reform litigation provides inadequate sup-
port for the proposition that coordinating ideals serve as a sufficient rule-
of-law constraint on judicial policy making. The notion that lower court 
judges worked in tandem to develop nationwide standards requires more 
proof than Feeley and Rubin deliver. Without such proof, there is simply 
too great a risk that the rule-of-law argument will operate as a 
smokescreen-concealing the fact that judges, freed to make policy, will 
focus on doing so and not on the de facto limits lower court judges in other 
jurisdictions place on them. 
Third, while Feeley and Rubin convincingly demonstrate that federal 
court judges played a critical policy-making role in prison reform litiga-
tion, Judicial Policy Making gives short shrift to the contextual nature of 
these decisions. Although recognizing that judicial decision making does 
not occur in a vacuum, Feeley and Rubin understate the critical role that 
both federal and state actors played in shaping the scope and sweep of 
prison reform litigation. To put it another way, rather than showing how 
courts operate as freestanding policy makers, the evidence Judicial Policy 
Making uncovers is a testament to how courts and elected officials partici-
pate in constitutional dialogues with each other. 
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Feeley and Rubin's failure to emphasize this connection between 
courts and elected government is unfortunate but understandable. The 
question they ask is whether policy making is a legitimate judicial func-
tion, not whether other parts of the government figure into judicial decision 
making. With that said, there is a direct link between the contextual nature 
of judicial decision making and the propriety of judicial policy making. 
Specifically, courts ought to engage in policy making in part because the 
Constitution is made more vital and durable by ongoing dialogues among 
the elected government, the courts, and the people. While this type of pol-
icy making may not be as far reaching as Feeley and Rubin envision, it is 
nevertheless a critical component of our constitutional order. 
I 
FEELEY AND RUBIN'S MODERN STATE 
JUSTIF1CATION FOR JuDiciAL PoLICY MAKING 
Big government operates as the baseline from which Feeley and 
Rubin assess the propriety of judicial policy making. Their central claim, 
that "policy making should be recognized-by judges and observers of 
judges-as an ordinary and a legitimate mode of action" (p. 6), is tied to 
the reality of the administrative state. For example, in explaining why fed-
eralism and separation of powers protections do not stand in the way of 
judicial policy making, Feeley and Rubin contend that these doctrines rest 
on "normative arguments ... inapplicable in our nationwide administrative 
era" {p. 341). As to the permanence of the administrative era, Feeley and 
Rubin think that "[w]e are much more likely to turn the clock back 500 
million years by bombing ourselves into protoplasmic slime than we are to 
turn it back 120 years to the preadministrative era" {p. 341). 
This "modern state" justification for judicial policy making is ex-
traordinarily relativistic. For Feeley and Rubin, if agency heads can legis-
late and adjudicate without violating the separation of powers, courts too 
should be able to make and implement policy. A rising tide, after all, raises 
all boats. On this point, Feeley and Rubin reject suggestions that agencies, 
unlike courts, are somehow democratically accountable. They dismiss ar-
guments that agencies operate within the statutory boundaries set by law 
makers both because agency heads often have substantial discretion to im-
plement state and federal programs (pp. 330-31), and because law makers 
"represent nothing but their own desire to get reelected" (p. 331) and there-
fore lack democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, according to this account, 
the actions of agency heads, "while enormously important to the citizenry, 
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are too numerous and frequently too technical for the legislators or the 
chief executive to monitor" (p. 333).7 
Feeley and Rubin likewise see federalism objections to judicial policy 
making as outdated. Highlighting "the national character of our policy" (p. 
201), they dismiss traditionalist claims that judicial oversight of state in-
stitutions is constitutionally problematic. Moreover, as was the case with 
their separation of powers analysis, Feeley and Rubin deem federalism as 
anathema to the administrative state. Specifically, "[b]ecause the modem 
administrative state is based on the idea that the government protects lib-
erty, it cannot rely on the structured inefficiency that federalist theory 
contemplates to protect citizens from government oppression" (p. 194). 
Rather, invoking the modem state as a metaphor for a nationalist melting 
pot of ethnic, cultural, economic, and ideological identities, Feeley and 
Rubin conclude that "the United States has one political community, and 
that political community is the United States" (p. 199). 8 Under this view, 
federal court judges are key players in advancing the nation state, bringing 
a national morality and a national perspective to local communities (p. 
203).9 
In understanding how federal court judges impose nationwide stan-
dards on the states, Feeley and Rubin focus their energies on prison reform 
litigation. Through this microanalysis, they build much of their· theory of 
judicial policy making (p. 4). Most significantly, they use prison reform 
litigation as a lens to understand whether judicial policy making makes use 
of the same techniques as agency policy making and, more importantly, 
whether judicial policy making is consistent with the judiciary's obligation 
to abide by the rule of law. 
The choice of prison reform seems obvious. Forty-eight of America's 
fifty-three jurisdictions (the fifty states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
7. Feeley and Rubin also tackle traditionalist claims that judicial policy making is inconsistent 
with the Framers' design. Noting that "courts have always performed a multiplicity of functions that 
involve social control and policy implementation," they suggest that the modem activist judiciary is 
grounded in the long-standing traditions of equity jurisprudence, traditions that were well known to the 
Framers. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN 
STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 328 (1998). For a parallel account, see 
Eisenberg & Y eazell, supra note 5. For a competing account of the Framers' vision, see Nagel, supra 
note 5; John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of 
the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1121, 1141~66 (1996). 
8. This argument parallels Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes 
on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994). For scholarly commentary that takes issue with 
this argument, see Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and 
Principle?, I 11 HARV. L. REv. 2180, 2212-28 (1998). 
9. As to whether local judges can transcend local mores to advance nationalist objectives, see 
J.\V. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION (1961) (highlighting the dilemma that district court judges faced in balancing their 
commitment to a nationalist Supreme Court with their allegiance to the segregationist culture of the 
South). 
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and the District of Columbia) have had one or more aspects of their prison 
facilities declared unconstitutional (pp. 39-42). Not surprisingly, court de-
cisions have run the gamut, "covering such diverse matters as residence 
facilities, sanitation, food, clothing, medical care, discipline, staff hirings, 
libraries, work, and education" (p. 41). Moreover, because judges fre-
quently employ structural injunctions to oversee these initiatives, prison 
reform litigation represents "the complex process by which grievances are 
perceived and articulated, and by which law is mobilized, applied, recon-
ceived, and understood" (p. 29). Or, as one reporter puts it, judges over-
seeing prison reform cases become so entrenched in policy making that 
they are "the real governors" of their states. 10 
Prison reform is telling for another reason. Rather than following 
some Supreme Court-dictated script, federal district judges were the writ-
ers, directors, and stars of these prison reform dramas. For Feeley and 
Rubin, the fact that so many courts were engaged in this enterprise is criti-
cally important. Specifically, in arguing that judicial decision making fol-
lows the same "modalities" as agency policy making, 11 Feeley and Rubin 
call attention to the myriad ways that district judges worked with state offi-
cials and other interests to advance their reform agenda. The stories of dis-
trict court judges also loom large in Feeley and Rubin's claim that rule-of-
law constraints limit judicial policy making. Claiming that doctrine "is not 
an individual idea" (p. 226) but an idea that "ultimately prevails as a means 
of integration for the majority of judges" (p. 227), Feeley and Rubin sug-
gest that district judges communicating through their written opinions have 
developed self-limiting standards that permeate prison reform decision 
making. 
This rule-of-law argument, like their arguments concerning the sepa-
ration of powers and federalism, is largely rooted in Feeley and Rubin's 
belief that nationwide policy making is the stuff of modern government. 
Judicial policy making, for example, is legitimated by the fact that "policy 
making was the dominant approach to modern governance and thus a valid 
mode of action for the judiciary" (p. 217). In other words, "the power and 
discretion of government [must] expand[]," for "the administrative state 
has changed our views about the pace and scope of doctrinal innovation 
generally" (p. 249). When it comes to prisons, Feeley and Rubin think the 
judiciary's predominance is both inevitable and appropriate. With 
Congress unwilling to create "a large, well-funded bureaucratic 
10. See The Real Governor, TIME, Jan. 26, 1976, at 65 (discussing Judge Frank Johnson's 
oversight of institutional reform litigation in Alabama). 
11. These modalities include program initiation, experimentation with alternative solutions, 
negotiation with affected parties, the promulgation of mles, and much more. See FEELEY & RUBIN, 
supra note 7, at 356. 
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agency ... , the task of wielding the modem state's administrative power 
fell to the judiciary" (pp. 190-91).12 
n 
THE ORDINARY AND THE EXTRAORDINARY OF PrusoN 
REFORM LITIGATION 
Feeley and Rubin's microanalysis of prison reform litigation attempts 
to develop a theory of judicial policy making around a single example. But 
what if prison reform litigation is atypical? Moreover, what if Feeley and 
Rubin's assessment of the facts of prison reform litigation is subject to an 
alternative interpretation? This Part will explore these matters and suggest 
that Feeley and Rubin's microanalysis, along with their broader claim 
about how courts craft policy, is vulnerable to attack. 
Before turning to these matters, let me make explicit something that 
was implicit in the prior section, namely, that Feeley and Rubin's analysis 
is premised on the inevitability of the administrative state, and with it, the 
appropriateness of using the administrative state as a normative benchmark 
from which to build their theory of judicial policy making. No doubt, the 
administrative state is here to stay. But to say that there is an administrative 
state is not enough. For those who believe that the "post-New Deal admin-
istrative state-is unconstitutional and its validation by the legal system ... a 
bloodless revolution," Feeley and Rubin's argument is a nonstarter.13 To 
answer these critics of modem government, Feeley and Rubin must explain 
why it is that the administrative state is itself legitimate. 
Feeley and Rubin offer no such explanation. At most, pointing to 
public choice and postmodem scholarship, they question whether elections 
distinguish agency policy making from the work of legislators (pp. 330-
31).14 This analysis, however, smacks of moral relativism. That is, agency 
policy making is legitimated by the fact that elections do not legitimate 
legislative policy making. 15 Along the same lines, it is not enough to say 
12. On the question of whether prisoners are a "discrete and insular minority" deserving special 
judicial prolection, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 'THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
97, 173-76 (1980) (highlighting class-based application of the death penalty). For their part, Feeley and 
Rubin call attention to the plight of prisoners, especially prisoners victimized by Southern ''plantation 
model" prisons. See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 7, at 51-55 (describing Cummins Farm in 
Arkansas). 
13. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1231 
(1994). Also, for those who acknowledge the necessity of an administrative state but not an unbounded 
administrative state, Feeley and Rubin's unqualified embrace of big government is problematic. 
14. Public choice theorists contend that elected officials "represent nothing but their own desire 
to get reelected"; postmoderiiists claim that political representation is a distortion "spawned by the 
unfounded assertion that one person represents the views of others ..•• " FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 
7, at33h 
15. Correspondingly, in answering charges that judicial policy making is problematic because 
judges-unlike agencies-are not subject to direct elected government supervision, Feeley and Rubin's 
response is relativistic. They claim that, in fact, popularly elected officials rarely check agency heads. 
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that judicial policy making is legitimate because the modem state embraces 
governmental problem solving. 16 
Perhaps my argument is unfair. Perhaps Feeley and Rubin's ultimate 
point is that judicial policy making is as legitimate as other types of policy 
making in the modem state. For example, it may be that courts and agen-
cies approach policy making in quite similar ways. This observation, of 
course, constitutes one of the central claims of Judicial Policy Making. In 
particular, building upon their study of prison reform litigation, Feeley and 
Rubin point to ways in which judicial and agency policy making are indis-
tinguishable from each other. "A good policy-making judge," according to 
this account, "should follow the same widely recognized principles" that 
guide administrators (p. 322). Like administrators, judges should obtain 
"information from as many groups as possible," should "regularly [tum] to 
experts in the fields who [have] developed solutions through hands-on ex-
perience," and should deal with problems of uncertainty "by proceeding 
incrementally" (p. 320). Correspondingly, a policy-making judge-through 
the appointment of special masters and the utilization of injunctions to 
maintain control over a lawsuit-can avoid the pitfalls of deciding a case at 
a moment in time where a changed understanding of the underlying facts 
can only be corrected through a reversal. A policy-making judge, more-
over, need not allow the parties before her to frame the issues that she will 
consider. Likewise, a policy-making judge is not bound by precedent-
based legal arguments. 
In the prison reform cases they study, Feeley and Rubin contend that 
judges, either directly or through special masters, did follow this model. 17 
In this way, they argue that traditionalist norms no longer apply to modem 
day adjudication. Feeley and Rubin thus consider outdated traditionalist 
arguments that the "distinctiveness of the judicial process-its expenditure 
of social resources on individual complaints, one at a time-is what unfits 
See id at 333. But this answer is insufficient First, if true, it may be that two wrongs do not make a 
right. Second, Feeley and Rubin never really prove this assertion. The question of how democratic 
government oversees agency decision making (and why that oversight is analogous to democratic 
government oversight of the judiciary) is never considered in a meaningful way. 
16. When all is said and done, Feeley and Rubin never advance an affirmative argument as to 
why judicial policy making is legitimate. Their argument, instead, is a refutation of traditionalist claims 
that judicial policy making violates either the structure of the Constitution or rule-of-law constraints. 
17. Feeley and Rubin's treatment of policy making by special masters as no different than policy 
making by judges is problematic. While speeial masters serve at the pleasure of the judge who appoints 
them, "[a]n independent monitor himself becomes a new actor in the political equation, whose position 
the judge must reckon in the political calculus." Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political 
Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43, 97 (1979). 
See, e.g., Resnick, supra note 5, at 437-38. For this reason, special masters present risks of their own, 
especially the risk that policy-making judges may well lose control of institutional reform litigation. 
Furthermore, the adversary process itself may limit the master's ability to serve a constructive policy-
making role. See Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE LJ. 1062, 1080-81 (1979). 
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the courts for much of the important work of government." 18 In their view, 
joy, not horror, is the feeling that the following depiction of a hearing on a 
Los Angeles school busing case ought to evoke: "Once one comprehends 
that the court is displacing the [school] board, ... the occasionally circus-
like quality of the hearing becomes more explicable, if not more orderly. It 
doesn't, as the judge has remarked upon occasion, look much like a court, 
and for good reason: it really isn't one." 19 To put it another way, when 
critics of judicial policy making talk of the "danger" that courts, in 
"developing a capacity to improve on the work of other institutions, may 
become altogether too much like them,"2° Feeley and Rubin argue that such 
a transformation is both appropriate and, in critical respects, already has 
occurred. 
But Feeley and Rubin's example-prison reform litigation-is not 
fully generalizable, and as a result, their proof is incomplete. To begin 
with, prison cases allow judges to be pro-active in ways that school deseg-
regation and other institutional reform litigation does- not. Rather than 
managing a case filed by, for example, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
(an interest group with a well-defined sense of the remedial relief it 
seeks),21 strong-willed plaintiffs do not figure into Feeley and Rubin's 
prison cases. Rather, judges often handpicked these cases from the hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of prisoner-filed pro se petitions (pp. 81, 100).22 
Judges, moreover, handpicked the counsel to represent prisoners in these 
lawsuits (pp. 61, 81, 100, 114). Witness, for example, the extraordinary 
role Judge William Jayne Justice played in launching prison reform litiga-
tion in Texas. After hearing William Turner, a Legal Defense Fund lawyer, 
deliver a speech on prisoners' rights, Judge Justice "resolved to develop a 
prisoners' rights case of his own and to contact Turner to see if he would 
represent the complainants .... To develop the issues in the case, Judge 
Justice asked his clerks to locate 'typical' [inmate] petitions" (p. 81). 
Prison cases are different from school and other institutional reform 
litigation for additional reasons. With so many inmates filing so many dif-
ferent types of petitions, a judge, rather than relying on counsel to filter 
18. HoROWITZ, supra note 5, at 298. 
19. Fletcher, supra note 5, at 694 (quoting Stephen C. Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of 
Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REv. 244, 259 (1977). 
20. HoROWITZ, supra note 5, at 298; see also David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and 
Company: Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. 
REv. 313 (1981) (arguing that courts attempting to shape efficacious remedies in institutional reform 
cases must deviate from traditional adjudicative modes to do so, and that such deviation jeopardizes the 
institutional legitimacy of the courts). 
21. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976). 
22. Prisoners typically have ample time to file such petitions and have little to lose by doing so. 
See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 639,682-83 
(1993). 
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information for her, is extremely well positioned to play a hands-on role. 
Moreover, in most of the cases Feeley and Rubin consider, prison officials 
worked in tandem with federal judges in an effort to squeeze money from 
state law makers.23 Furthermore, state governors did not challenge judicial 
intervention and state law makers "were as often supportive as condemna-
tory" (p. 168). 
The willingness of prison officials, state law makers, and governors to 
play ball with federal judges is a critical and distinctive feature of the 
prison reform saga.24 Courts could behave like agencies, in part, because 
their decision making was accorded the same respect as an agency's cease 
and desist order. Absent a generally supportive implementing community, 
however, there is reason to doubt that prison reform litigation would have 
followed the agency model. Without the powers of purse or sword, federal 
judges, unlike agencies, must overcome inherent limits to their authority. 
Specifically, to force compliance by recalcitrant state officials, federal 
judges must appeal to other parts of the government. 25 Of course, policy-
making judges can improve the likelihood of the implementing commu-
rrity's signing off on their orders by, for example, inducing state officials 
"to participate in a deliberative process to formulate and implement an ef-
fective remedy.'026 But policy-making judges are far more dependent on the 
implementing community than are their agency counterparts. 27 
Feeley and Rubin acknowledge the critical role that the implementing 
commurrity plays in actualizing judicial policy making. Their depiction of 
prison reform litigation, despite its trumpeting of the court's power to 
set policy, is replete with examples of how judges took state and federal 
23. While Feeley and Rubin claim that the majority of prison officials opposed these lawsuits, 
see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 7, at 168, three of their four state case studies suggest otherwise, see 
id. at 61 (Arkansas), 101-02 (Colorado), 116 (Santa Clara, California). In Arkansas, for example, 
prison commissioner Robert Sarver was "quite willing to aid the court, and it was his witnesses, more 
than those of the complainants, who provided Judge [J. Smith] Henley with the most trenchant 
criticisms and effective diagnoses of problems in the prison system." I d. at 308. 
24. Court appointed special masters too were accorded great respect. In Santa Clara, for example, 
prison officials "were clearly willing to be ordered around by a judicially appointed officer, and 
perhaps even pleased by the prospect of submitting to the authority of an expert." I d. at 122. 
25. A dramatic example of this phenomenon is the Little Rock desegregation cnse, where 
President Eisenhower sent Army troops into Little Rock to force compliance with a court order. See 
Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of 
American Democracy, 10 S. CAL. L. REv. 1641 (1997). 
26. Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in 
Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 805, 856 (1990). 
27. Agencies too are dependent on the implementing community. Powerful interests, for 
example, can navigate around agency demands by lobbying both the White House and Congress (or the 
governor's office and state law makers). More strikingly, through the formation of so-called "iron 
triangles," agency heads sometimes work in a partnership with the regulated community and their 
legislative overseers. Nevertheless, whereas a court must go through an agency to secure 
implementation of institutional reform litigation, agency enforcement efforts are not similarly 
encumbered. 
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interests into account in fashioning their institutional remedies. First, judi-
cial participation in prison reform litigation was an outgrowth of efforts 
during the 1960s to nationalize civil rights and liberties protections. 
Through Great Society legislation, Congress facilitated stepped-up agency 
and judicial enforcement of constitutional rights, especially in the South. 
School desegregation is an obvious example. With lower court judges re-
fusing to pressure Southern school systems to desegregate, Congress, 
through the 1964 Civil Rights Act,28 authorized Department of Justice 
school desegregation litigation and prohibited the dissemination of federal 
funds to school systems (or anyone else) that discriminated on the basis of 
race. Moreover, through the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act,29 Congress sought to nationalize state educational systems through 
cash awards to systems to promote federal objectives, including desegre-
gation.30 With Congress and the White House backing school desegrega-
tion, the federal courts too reentered the school desegregation fray by, 
among other things, managing school systems through structural injunc-
tions. 
Prison reform litigation is part and parcel of this campaign to expand 
constitutional protections by nationalizing state institutions. For example, 
through Miranda v. Arizona,31 Mapp v. Ohio,32 and other landmark deci-
sions, the Supreme Court already had signaled its willingness to intercede 
on behalf of criminal suspects (pp. 159-60). Against this backdrop, lower 
court judges launched their prison reform movement. In other words, as 
Feeley and Rubin put it, "the basic relationship between the civil rights 
movement and prison reform is causal, not adventitious" (p. 159). 
Second, judicial participation in prison reform litigation did not con-
tradict the preferences of elected government officials. As discussed 
above/3 state officials did not resist court ordered prison reform. The fed-
eral government also supported these initiatives, at least during the heyday 
of prison reform litigation. Justice Department filings backed prison reform 
initiatives as well (pp. 82, 168). Through its Bureau of Prisons, moreover, 
the Justice Department played a leadership role in advancing "progressive 
prison practice[s]," including the provision of pro-plaintiff expert testi-
mony in prison cases (p. 164). For its part, Congress, in 1965, established 
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration which "invested heavily 
in developing and promoting uniform standards ... derived from the fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons" (pp. 167-68). In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil 
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat 241. 
29. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat 27. 
30. See Neal Devins & James B. Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the 
Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NoTRE DAI>m L. REv. 1243, 1245-51 (1984). 
31. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
32. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
33. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,34 "an explicit effort to impose na-
tional standards on state prisons" (p. 168). 
Third, federal judges paid close attention to these signals. They regu-
larly referred to Bureau of Prison practices in their decisions and accorded 
"enormous credence" to the testimony of Bureau officials (p. 164). Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration efforts to establish national stan-
dards likewise played a prominent role in court decision making (pp. 370-
71). In addition to these efforts to nationalize prisons, the American 
Correctional Association, the Department of Justice, and the American Bar 
Association also embraced national standard setting and, in so doing, 
helped shape prison reform litigation (pp. 164-65, 370-72). Indeed, as 
Feeley and Rubin acknowledge, the existence of such standards "is often a 
major incentive for decision makers to define and address a particular 
problem" (p. 165). For this very reason, Feeley and Rubin's broader claims 
about judicial policy making seem overstated. No doubt, they may well be 
correct in arguing both that federal judges were at the fore of the prison 
reform movement, and that federal judges viewed the Eighth Amendment 
ban against cruel and unusual punishment as an open-ended grant of juris-
diction to set national prison standards. Yet rather than establishing norms 
and standards themselves, federal judges appeared to be implementing na-
tionalist norms set by politically accountable institutions. 35 As such, the 
preferences of elected government officials, not court-created coordinating 
ideas, may well have set the parameters of prison reform decision mak-
ing.36 
In light of recent events, this conclusion seems inescapable. Specifi-
cally, when Congress and the White House began to signal their disap-
proval of prison reform litigation in the late 1980s, federal courts relented. 
For example, Justice Department lawyers, over the objections of plaintiffs' 
attorneys, successfully convinced federal judges to relinquish jurisdiction 
in some long-standing cases (p. 50). By 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court 
joined forces with the Bush Justice Department and engineered its own 
"retrenchment" of judicial policy making in this area (p. 3). By 1994, the 
"retrenchment" was complete. "With the advent of a Republican-controlled 
Congress in 1994 and a Democratic president who was intent on 
34. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-247,94 Stat. 349. 
35. Along these lines, it is also significant that federal judges did not seek to take over the federal 
prison system. Rather, showing great deference to Bureau of Prison arguments, district judges steered 
clear of federal prison litigation. See FEELEY & RuBIN, supra note 7, at 129-43. In other words, rather 
than making policy, district judges opted for a system that put into place standards set forth by a federal 
agency. 
36. Of course, it may be that elected officials and federal judges shared a vision of prison reform. 
But to argue that coordinating ideas served as an effective rule-of-law constraint requires some 
evidence that judges did not simply operate within the parameters set by Congress and the Justice 
Department. On this point, the judiciary's recent retreat in this area-when Congress and the White 
House no longer supported prison reform-speaks volumes. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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preempting the tough-on-crime issue, restriction of prisoners' rights be-
came a matter of national consensus" (p. 382). In 1994 and again in 1996, 
Congress enacted legislation limiting court-ordered remedies in prison re-
form litigation (p. 382). 37 
The lesson here is obvious: Namely, federal court judges do not make 
policy in a vacuum. Instead, courts pay attention to the social and political 
forces that surround them. As such, the story of prison reform is not simply 
one of judicial policy making, but of how courts make policy in conjunc-
tion with other parts of the government, and the people as well. 38 To their 
credit, Feeley and Rubin call attention to the myriad ways in which federal 
judges took into account the desires of state and federal officials. But they 
do not consider what this means. In particular, how should courts interact 
with other parts of the government in sorting out highly contentious social 
issues? Do inherent limits on judicial authority 'constrain judicial policy 
making? More specifically, can courts make policy (and have that policy 
stick) if the implementing community disapproves of the courts' initia-
tives? If not, is policy making truly a standard method of judicial acti<?n? 
In asking these questions, I do not mean to suggest that courts do not 
make policy. But judicial policy making is not truly analogous to agency 
policy making. Sometimes courts appear to behave an awful lot like agen-
cies, and prison reform litigation may fit this mold. 39 Yet even here the 
courts' sensitivity to the preferences of elected officials suggests other-
wise; that is, courts almost always take into account that they have "neither 
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend 
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of [their] judg-
ments."40 
III 
CONCLUSION: THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH? 
To say that inherent limits on judicial authority compel successful 
policy-making judges to play ball with other parts of the government begs 
37. In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, legislation 
requiring an individual prisoner to demonstrate that alleged overcrowding violates her Eighth 
Amendment rights. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat 1796. In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act, legislation that limits 
the court's power to, among other things, appoint special masters, approve consent decrees, and 
maintain jurisdiction over prison reform litigation. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66. 
38. This also means that the courts' power to make policy will be constrained-if not eliminated 
altogether-when the people and their representatives reject such judicial initiatives. In the case of . 
prison reform litigation, populist resistance ultimately overtook judicial policy making. See supra notes 
36-37 and accompanying text. 
39. With that said, courts need not follow the Administrative Procedure Act or other law maker 
specified procedures. 
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 
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the more fundamental question of whether courts ought to shape public 
discourse by managing schools, prisons, and the like in the first place. The 
answer to this question, for reasons detailed above, cannot be that courts 
and agencies make policy in fundamentally similar ways. Moreover, with-
out an affirmative justification for the administrative state, the argument 
that the modern state in and of itself legitimates judicial policy making 
seems ill-founded. Weaknesses in Feeley and Rubin's proof, however, do 
not mean that traditionalists are correct in arguing that courts ought not to 
shape public discourse through value-laden policy judgments. 
Traditionalists miss the mark when arguing that "[t]he judiciary's fre-
quent intervention in ordinary political affairs works against both the pres-
ervation and the healthy growth of our constitutional traditions.''~1 Instead, 
the Constitution is made more vibrant and more stable by constitutional 
dialogues among the people, judges, and elected officials.42 In particular, as 
Alexander Bickel put it, complex social policy issues, especially those that 
implicate constitutional values, are best resolved through "the sweaty 
intimacy of creatures locked in combat.''43 Of particular significance, 
judges and politicians sometimes react differently to social and political 
forces. Congress, for example, focuses its "energy mostly on the claims of 
large populous interests, or on the claims of the wealthy and powerful, 
since that tends to be the best route to re-election.''44 Courts, in contrast, are 
less affected by these pressures, for federal judges possess life tenure. Ac-
cordingly, because special interest group pressures affect courts and 
elected officials in different ways, a full-ranging consideration of the costs 
and benefits of different policy outcomes is best accomplished by a gov-
ernment-wide decision-making process. For this reason, courts and elected 
officials should both be activists in shaping constitutional values. 
Courts should be activist for other reasons as well. Sometimes courts 
are willing to take a stand on issues that the elected government either is 
uninterested in or considers too hot to handle. School desegregation, abor-
tion, and reapportionment are examples of courts playing such a leadership 
role. Elected officials too may need the judiciary to play a leadership role. 
Late 1960s voting rights decisions (upholding congressional reforms) gave 
cover to Southern officials willing to comply with the new policy but un-
willing to take responsibility for it.45 Another example of this phenomenon 
41. ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (1989). My point here concerns the soundness, not the legitimacy, of the 
judiciary's participation in policy making. 
42. This point is further developed in Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and 
Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REv. 83 (1998). 
43. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 261. 
44. Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 269, 273 (1993). 
45. See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 
Nw. U. L. REv. 985, 1017 (1990). 
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is prison reform litigation, where prison officials sometimes formed 
partnerships with federal court judges in an effort to secure funding from 
state law makers. 46 
Judicial activism, of course, is a far cry from judicial supremacy. 
Rather, emotionally charged and highly divisive issues are best resolved 
through political compromises that yield middle ground solutions. In par-
ticipating in these compromises, courts ought to be activist, not absolutist. 
Witness, for example, the disastrous backlash that occurred in the wake of 
Roe v. Wade.41 By seeking to settle the abortion controversy in a single 
ruling,48 the Court brought much woe down upon itself and the nation. Had 
the Court moved more cautiously, allowing the elected government and the 
people an opportunity to shape abortion rights, there is reason to think that 
the abortion controversy would have been less intense.49 
In the case of prisons, judges were able to play a leadership role be-
cause the implementing community supported much of their work. But 
judges who sought to be dictatorial, ignoring the signals elected officials 
sent them, were far less successful than judges who sought to mediate 
compromise solutions among the affected interests.5° Feeley and Rubin 
certainly understand the critical role that the implementing community 
played in the prison dispute, calling attention to the ways in which judges 
worked with state and federal officials. Likewise, they understand that in-
crementalism and compromise are critical tools for a policy-making judge. 
For these and many other reasons, Judicial Policy Making and the Modem 
State is an important and valuable book. 
With that said, Feeley and Rubin undersell the nexus between judicial 
policy making and the preferences of elected government officials. Judicial 
policy making is extraordinarily contextnal and, as such, is constrained as 
much by political realities as it is by the rule of law. More significantly, 
federal courts are not agencies and, consequently, must operate in accor-
dance with their strengths and limits. One of these limits is the necessity of 
eliciting elected government support, and with it, the need to pay close at-
tention to the signals sent by elected officials. To put it another way, judi-
cial policy making in the modern state operates in the shadow of the 
desires of elected government officials. 
46. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
47. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
48. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
MAKING OF RoE V. WADE, 585-87 (1994); Bob Woodward, The Abortion Papers, WASH. PoST, Jan. 
22, 1989, atD-1. 
49. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 114; Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 
MicH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999). In contrast, Brown v. Board of Education is a model in judicial 
statesmanship. See id. 
50. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 871-75, 878-80. 
